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On the role of protases in conditional statements: 
Some evidence from Hindi* 
Ghanshyam Sharma 
 
 
 
Providing evidence from Hindi, the present study determines the crucial 
role played by the protasis (or antecedent or P-clause) in the actualization 
of conditional constructions. It maintains that tense-aspect-mood elements 
of the protasis establish different degrees of hypotheticality in a condition-
al statement. The paper questions some widespread misunderstandings 
about the clause ordering in conditional constructions, namely that condi-
tionals can exhibit both the protasis-apodosis (P-Q) and apodosis-protasis 
(Q-P) orderings. By examining data from Hindi and making reference to 
data from other languages, the paper reiterates our earlier claim that 
protasis-apodosis ordering in conditional constructions cannot be reversed 
and advances a new idea that a ‘conditional string’ is the defining charac-
teristic of a conditional construction. In other words, it is either the propo-
sition contained in the apodosis – not the entire apodosis – which is pre-
posed by the speaker to accomplish different communicative tasks, or the 
entire ‘conditional string’ which is added to a non-conditional statement to 
give it conditional dimensions. 
1. Overview 
Despite being a most extensively studied subject, conditionals still remain 
a hotly debated topic – both in philosophy and linguistics – largely due to 
the peculiarity of these constructions. The present paper looks into the 
crucial role played by the protasis (i.e. P-clause, antecedent, subordinate 
clause or dependent clause)1 in the overall structure of conditional con-
structions. It discusses certain evidence from Hindi to determine the role 
played by the tense-aspect-mood (TAM hereafter) elements in the classifica-
tion of conditional statements. In addition, it makes yet again an attempt to 
reiterate that protasis-apodosis (i.e. P-Q) ordering is the only possible 
clause order in natural languages. Thus, the paper rejects the idea that con-
  
ditionality may be expressed through apodosis-protasis ordering. As an 
additional point, the paper puts forward a new theory which – however 
bizarre it might seem at first glance – may have some implications for dif-
ferent brands of syntactic analyses. The basic idea is that in a conditional 
statement the conditionality is introduced exclusively by a conditional 
string which stretches from the protasis marker, if in English, up through 
what is generally considered to be an apodosis marker, i.e. then or [Ø], in 
English. This conditional string, in my view, is the sole factor in the actual-
ization of a conditional statement, to which can be attached any kind of 
proposition in a language, thus generating wide varieties of conditional 
statements. In this manner, the paper argues that the attachment of a condi-
tional string (i.e. protasis plus the so-called apodosis marker) to the apodo-
sis proposition should not be viewed as analogous with the attachment of 
an adverbial clause to the main clause (as is common in most brands of 
syntactic analyses) nor should there be a need to propose two different 
kinds of attachments, one for the sentence-initial protasis (namely as IP/CP 
adjunction) and the other for the sentence-final protasis (namely as VP 
adjunction).2 
2. What is a conditional statement? 
It is a widely accepted belief that conditional statements are complex sen-
tences built up from two constituent clauses: the first being the if-clause 
and the second the then-clause. However, given the diverse syntactic varie-
ties of conditional statements attested in different languages, it proves dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to give a clear-cut definition which might encom-
pass all the characteristics of conditional statements. To begin with, it is 
generally assumed that conditional statements may have either an overt or 
a covert marking of two clauses. Besides, it is also commonly believed that 
they may overtly mark just one of the two clauses or may exhibit the same 
marker in both clauses. On the other hand, conditional statements are re-
ported to be employed in situations where they convey quasi-conditional 
meanings rather than real hypothetical meanings.3 Furthermore, there are 
documented cases of reduced and pseudo-conditionals4 across the languag-
es in which conditional statements may have either a covert protasis or a 
covert apodosis in the common ground. Realizing this difficulty, Declerck 
and Reed (2001: 9) have devised a general definition which tries to cover 
the basic characteristics of English conditionals, namely, “a conditional is 
a two-clause structure in which one of the clauses is introduced by if (pos-
  
sibly preceded by only, even or except) or except if (viz. unless).” Needless 
to say, this definition too is inadequate and says almost nothing about the 
‘conditionalhood’ of English conditionals, let alone the characteristics of 
conditionals in general. Moreover, the mere presence or absence of the 
protasis marker in a statement cannot be the sole basis for considering a 
statement conditional since, as mentioned above, there are languages which 
do not obligatorily mark the protasis and others which do not mark either 
of the two clauses. Thus, I argue that it is the conditional string (viz. ‘if—
—then’…, or, to put it in non-English terms, ‘α——β’…) – with or with-
out overt markers – which is the defining characteristic of a conditional 
statement. According to this view, a conditional string is to be regarded as 
equipped with what others have taken to be the markers of two clauses – 
either overtly or covertly – and can be attached to any clause (viz. an asser-
tion, an order, a question, etc.) of a language to fashion it into an apodosis 
clause in a conditional statement, as in (1)–(5) 
 
(1)  [If you heat water to 100 degrees celsius, Ø] it boils. 
(2)  [If it rains this afternoon, Ø] everybody will stay home. 
(3)  [If I become President, Ø] I’ll lower taxes. 
(4)  [If it’s raining now, then] your laundry is getting wet. 
(5)  [If it’s raining now, then] don’t go outside. 
 
where the conditional string – which contains all the elements between 
square brackets – consists of the protasis and either a null marker Ø or the 
overt marker then. As is clear from examples (1), (2) and (3), the condi-
tional string in English may contain a null marker [Ø] as well. As a conse-
quence, only the remaining part of the statement – which lies outside the 
square brackets – is to be considered an apodosis proposition. Without 
entering into the syntactic details of the argument, we claim that for an 
adequate analysis of conditionals, any syntactic theory has to take into 
account the concept of the conditional string rather than dividing a condi-
tional statement into two traditionally established parts (i.e. the if-clause 
and the then-clause), basically following conventional wisdom. The condi-
tional string, in my view, is the sole factor which renders a statement a 
conditional statement. The protasis, thus, is the founding clause rather than 
a dependent or subordinate clause in a conditional statement, as has wrong-
ly been assumed in most of the literature on conditionals.5 We reject the 
orthodox division of a conditional statement into two separate entities: 
 
(6)  [[If-PROPOSITION] [then-PROPOSITION]] 
  
in which then proform is heedlessly considered to be a marker of the apo-
dosis and thus is considered to be an integral part of it. We rather propose 
the division of a conditional statement along the following lines: 
 
(7)  [[If-PROPOSITION then] [-PROPOSITION]] 
 
In this way, it can be said that a conditional statement is a statement which 
obligatorily contains the conditional string. The conditional string induces 
the hearer to suppose a case which is different than the case present in the 
common ground and thus introduces an alternative situation to the dis-
course. In semantic terms, the conditional string is the sole means of intro-
ducing conditionalhood to any sentence type in a language. Borrowing 
truth-conditional semantics terminology, it can be stated that a conditional 
string creates a suppositional world – a possible world – which is different 
from the actual world and in which the proposition contained in the apodo-
sis has to be true. Using Fauconnier’s (1994) terminology, it can be said 
that the conditional string sets up a mental space wherein the content of an 
apodosis (an assertion, an imperative, an interrogative, etc.) is understood 
to exist. Moreover, in terms of mental model theory, it can be said that the 
conditional string serves as a basis for constructing a mental model of the 
state of affairs from which the conclusion in the apodosis has to be drawn.6 
As stated above, the conditional string may introduce various meanings 
into a conditional statement. For example, it may serve as a premise in 
inferential or hypothetical conditionals or it can create a situation in which 
the speaker has to deliver his or her illocutions in the apodosis, producing 
the so-called speech-act conditional. To sum up, the conditional string hy-
pothetically may be equipped either with both of the markers or just one of 
them. 
3. The position of the protasis in a conditional statement 
In this section we make an attempt to determine the exact position of the 
protasis in a conditional statement, thus providing some evidence in sup-
port of our earlier claim (Sharma 2010), namely that in a conditional 
statement there may be the protasis-apodosis ordering only. As is widely 
reported, Greenberg (1963: 66) in his Universal of Word Order 14 states 
that: “In conditional statements, the conditional clause precedes the con-
clusion as the normal order in all languages.” Indeed, numerous studies 
have suggested that the protasis-apodosis clause order is in fact the univer-
  
sal order as it has a resemblance to the order of human reasoning and fur-
thermore shows “parallels between order of elements in language and order 
of elements in experience”.7 In spite of this universally accepted fact, it is 
also acknowledged that many languages seem to exhibit the apodosis-
protasis ordering as well. In fact, the abundance of data displaying the apo-
dosis-protasis ordering in world languages has led linguists to believe that 
the protasis in final position indicates an after-thought on the part of the 
speaker. Another speculative argument goes as follows: “Given that it 
seems to be commoner cross-linguistically for the protasis to be marked 
overtly as non-factual than for the apodosis to be so marked …, placing the 
overtly marked protasis in front of the unmarked apodosis avoids the apo-
dosis being interpreted as a factual statement” (Comrie 1986: 84). As I 
maintain elsewhere (Sharma 2010), contrary to the widely-held belief, I 
show that no language seems to exhibit a marked apodosis in the sentence-
initial position. In other words, there is no evidence of any sort to demon-
strate that a language may indeed have the apodosis-protasis ordering in 
conditionals. Broadly speaking, the apodosis marking is considered to be 
done through a proform – generally a resumptive pronoun or a time adver-
bial – such as then in English. However, as will become clear from our 
subsequent discussion, we do not consider then to be an apodosis marker. 
Furthermore, there are no data from any language to suggest that the so-
called sentence-initial apodosis can ever be marked, either overtly or co-
vertly. According to our line of reasoning, the protasis is the basis of a 
conditional string which includes the so-called apodosis marker as well. 
Thus, the idea that the protasis may follow the apodosis is simply untena-
ble and misleading.  
Let us now develop some further arguments in support of our hypothe-
sis. In different typological studies it has been extensively reported that 
most languages overtly mark either the protasis or the apodosis, or both 
(Comrie 1986; Xrakovskij 2005). Following this line of thought, we can 
postulate the following four hypothetical types of clause combinations 
under which all languages can be classified. 
 
(8)  a. [Overtly marked P   +  Overtly marked Q] 
 b. [Overtly marked P   + Non overtly marked Q] 
 c. [Not overtly marked P  + Overtly marked Q] 
 d. [Not overtly marked P  + Not overtly marked Q] 
 
No language seems to exclusively belong to just one of the above four cat-
egories. As mentioned in the previous section, some overtly mark both the 
  
protasis and the apodosis (8a), others mark either the protasis (8b) or the 
apodosis (8c) and there may also be languages without any means to overt-
ly mark either of the two. Furthermore, even if a language has at its dispos-
al the means to overtly mark both the protasis and the apodosis, it may or 
may not obligatorily employ them. For example, English and Hindi appar-
ently have means to overtly mark both the protasis and the apodosis, but 
English obligatorily marks the protasis only whereas Hindi obligatorily 
requires the use of the particle to (i.e. then) to express conditionality, 
which is generally considered to be the marker of the apodosis. Likewise, 
Mandarin is reputed to have the means to mark both clauses, but unlike 
English and Hindi, it is reported to not mark them obligatorily. In fact 
Mandarin may allow both the protasis and the apodosis to remain un-
marked. Thus, bearing in mind the obligation or non-obligation for overt 
marking in the protasis and the apodosis, we can revise the list of different 
types of combinations expressed in (8), and hypothetically have four dif-
ferent categories, as in (9) 
 
(9) a. [Obligatorily marked P   + Obligatorily marked Q] 
b. [Obligatorily marked P   + Non-obligatorily marked Q] 
c. [Non-obligatorily marked P  + Obligatorily marked Q] 
d. [Non-obligatorily marked P  + Non-obligatorily marked Q] 
 
As mentioned above, languages such as English, French and Italian are 
reported to obligatorily mark the protasis and thus can be said to belong to 
the category in (9b), whereas Hindi – and presumably many other Indo-
Aryan languages as well – can be considered to belong to the category in 
(9c) since it does not mark the protasis obligatorily and requires the apodo-
sis to be marked obligatorily. Mandarin, on the other hand, does not require 
any clauses to be obligatorily marked and therefore should be included in 
the category in (9d). Now, let us examine the above four classes, one by 
one, to check if indeed our argument can be proved valid. 
 
 
3.1. Class 1: Obligatorily marked P + Obligatorily marked Q 
Only reliable data from this group of languages could provide any conclu-
sive proof to demonstrate if a language may in fact have apodosis-protasis 
ordering in a conditional statement. However, to our knowledge, there is no 
record of any language in which the obligatory marking of two clauses is 
done through two overt and distinct markers.8 Nevertheless, closely related 
  
to this class, there is the case of the Ngiyambaa language in which the 
same marker is reported to be used in both clauses. In fact Comrie (1986: 
84) cites the unique case of Ngiyambaa, observing that “in Ngiyambaa, 
with past tense counterfactuals, both clauses have the same overt marking 
(with the clitic -ma), and the first must be interpreted as protasis, …” 
 
(10) Nginuu-ma-ni burray giyi, ngindu-ma-ni yada gurawiyi 
Lit. ‘your-counterfactual-this child was, you-counterfactual-this well 
looked-after’ 
‘If this child had been yours, you would have looked after it well.’9 
 
It is not quite clear whether the so-called past tense counterfactual mor-
pheme attested in the protasis and the apodosis in (10), viz. ma, does in 
fact mark both the protasis and the apodosis or if it performs different 
functions in different contexts, nor whether this phenomenon is limited to 
this type of conditional only or is attested in all other types of conditionals 
as well. However, the simple fact is that in Ngiyambaa, in the case of mark-
ing of two clauses through the same morpheme – no matter the purpose – the 
first clause is always considered the protasis, which clearly supports our 
hypothesis that there is indeed only protasis-apodosis ordering in natural 
languages. 
 
 
3.2. Class 2: Obligatorily marked P + Not-obligatorily marked Q 
Now let us consider the second class, a class of languages in which accord-
ing to traditional analyses only the protasis is believed to be marked obliga-
torily. The data from English, French and Italian, for example, seem to 
suggest an obligatory marking of the protasis (obtained through if, si and 
se, respectively) and an optional marking of the apodosis (obtained typical-
ly through some sort of proform, viz. then, alors and allora, respectively, 
which cannot appear sentence-initially). Although it is a topic of a separate 
study – thus outside the scope of this paper – whether the above mentioned 
proforms are in fact markers of the apodosis or of some other pragmatic 
elements, even a cursory examination of then reveals that English in reality 
has a null marker [Ø] and uses then to express bi-conditional (i.e. if and 
only if) meanings, e.g. in (10)10 
 
(10) a.  If you mow my lawn, I’ll pay you ten dollars.  
b.  If you mow my lawn, then I’ll pay you ten dollars. 
  
 
(10b) in fact means that ten dollars would be paid if, and only if, the lawn 
is mowed. Given that this purported English apodosis marker then carries a 
bi-conditionality meaning derived from the pragmatic scalarity in the prot-
asis, a plausible explanation would be that it is associated with the protasis 
rather than with the apodosis. Then in fact is a pragmatic marker which 
induces implicatures, giving rise to bi-conditional readings, a topic that still 
requires much more serious investigation than it has received so far. Thus, 
to show the pragmatic affiliation of then with the protasis, we can roughly 
present (10) in the following manner: 
 
(11) a. [If you mow my lawn, Ø] I’ll pay you ten dollars. 
b. [[If you mow my lawn Ø] then] I’ll pay you ten dollars. 
 
where both (11a) and (11b) have a null marker and (11b) in addition has a 
pragmatic marker then which gives it if and only if reading. We can notice 
this meaning when we prepose the apodosis proposition. Thus, (11a) and 
(11b) can be rewritten as (12a) and (12b) respectively:  
 
(12) a. I’ll pay you ten dollars [if you mow my lawn Ø]. 
b. I’ll pay you ten dollars [if, and only if, you mow my lawn Ø]. 
 
Therefore, according to our line of thinking, then is a pragmatic marker 
rather than an apodosis marker and pragmatically belongs to the protasis. 
Thus, it goes without saying that we do not regard (12a) and (12b) as cases 
of apodosis-protasis ordering. We consider that in these examples, the apo-
dosis proposition – which was a part of the apodosis in a normal protasis-
apodosis ordering – has simply been preposed. We argue that then is a part 
of the conditional string, rather than of an apodosis and makes an anaphor-
ic reference to the protasis. In order to marshal our argument, let us ex-
amine some other characteristics of then. Firstly, as Bhatt and Pancheva 
(2006)11 have noted, then has to be adjacent to the protasis, as in (13a): 
 
(13) a.   If it rains, then I think that we should stay at home. 
b.* If it rains, I think that then we should stay home. 
 
In syntactic terms, it has been argued that the surface location of then 
marks a predicate that combines with the if-clause and therefore then must 
be structurally adjacent to the if-clause. However, the fact that then in such 
circumstances has to be adjacent to the protasis also proves that it is prag-
  
matically associated with the protasis rather than with the apodosis as it 
has to pick out the scalarity from the protasis. Furthermore, then has a 
pragmatic role to play which is derived from the protasis and has no se-
mantic role to play as far as its presumed affinity with the apodosis is con-
cerned. 
Secondly, there is a restriction on the use of then in those situations in 
which the protasis contains pragmatic elements expressing other pragmatic 
scales. In fact, being a pragmatic scalarity marker, then conflicts with other 
scalarity markers such as even if and only if, as is clear from examples (14) 
and (15): 
 
(14) Even if it rains, *(then) the football game will happen. 
(15) Only if it is sunny, *(then) I will visit you. 
 
If we look at (14) and (15) carefully, it becomes evident that Bhatt and 
Pancheva’s account of the above mentioned phenomenon does not seem to 
hold. It is not clear in the least, for example, what syntactic rules are pre-
sumed to preclude an appearance of then in (14) and (15) whose position is 
claimed to mark a predicate.  
Likewise, there is yet another restriction on the use of then when it is 
employed in the so-called generic conditionals. Iatridou (1994) and Dan-
cygier and Sweetser (1997), for instance, have variably argued12 that there 
is a restriction on the use of then when the protasis contains reference to 
generic time or event, as in (16): 
 
(16) If Mary bakes a cake, *(then) she gives some slices of it to John. 
 
where then anaphorically picks up a generic time reference from the prota-
sis rather than from the apodosis and requires the apodosis to have the sim-
ilar generic reference. The above mentioned characteristics of then clearly 
reveal its pragmatic nature and structural association with the protasis ra-
ther than with the apodosis. We can thus conclude that data from this class 
of languages do not provide convincing evidence to consider apodosis-
protasis ordering valid. 
 
 
3.3. Class 3: Not obligatorily marked P + Obligatorily marked Q 
Now let us consider the class of languages in (9c) to which Hindi belongs. 
The strongest evidence against the purported apodosis-protasis ordering of 
  
clauses in conditional statements in fact comes from Hindi.13 The use of the 
so-called apodosis marker to (then) in Hindi is obligatory regardless of the 
presence or absence of the protasis marker agar (if), as can be seen in (17). 
It is attached to the protasis even when the apodosis has to dislocate in the 
apodosis-protasis ordering, as is attested in (18): 
 
(17) (agar) Rām āyā,     to  mɛ̃ us-se  pūchū̃gā 
(if)  Ram come-PFV.M.SG  then I he-ABL ask-FUT.M.1SG 
‘If Ram comes/came, I will/would ask him.’ 
 
(18) mɛ̃ Rām-se  pūchū̃gā   agar vo āyā     to 
I Ram-ABL ask-FUT.M.1SG if  he come-PFV.M.SG  then 
‘I will/would ask Ram if he comes/came.’ 
 
As mentioned above, in Hindi the apodosis marker to (then) has to remain 
attached to the protasis even when a conditional statement has to have the 
so-called apodosis-protasis clause ordering, as in (18). In fact an absence or 
a displacement of to (then) renders a Hindi conditional either ungrammati-
cal or semantically odd, as can be noticed in (19a)–(19f): 
 
(19) a.* agar Rām āyā    ― maĩ us-se  pūchū̃gā 
if  Ram come-PFV.M.SG ― I  he- ABL ask-FUT.M.1SG 
b.* ― Rām āyā     ― maĩ  us-se  pūchū̃gā  
― Ram come-PFV.M.SG  ― I  he- ABL ask-FUT.M.1SG 
c.? ―  maĩ  Rām-se  pūchū̃gā   agar vo āyā 
― I  Ram-ABL ask-FUT.M.1SG if  he come-PFV.M.SG 
d.* to  maĩ  Rām-se  pūchū̃gā   agar vo āyā 
 then I  Ram-ABL ask-FUT.M.1SG if  he come-PFV.M.SG 
e.* to  maĩ  Rām-se  pūchū̃gā   — vo āyā 
then I  Ram-ABL ask-FUT.M.1SG — he come-PFV.M.SG 
f.* ― maĩ  Rām-se  pūchū̃gā   ―  vo āyā 
― I  Ram-ABL ask-FUT.M.1SG ― he come-PFV.M.SG 
‘I will/would ask Ram if he comes/ came.’ 
 
On the grammaticality test, the situation in the Hindi examples in (19) can 
be summarized as in (20) where α and β are markers of the protasis and 
apodosis, respectively, P and Q the propositions contained in the protasis 
and the apodosis, and Ø, a null marker: 
 
(20) a. [αP → ØQ]  A grammatically unacceptable conditional string 
  
b. [ØP → ØQ] A grammatically unacceptable conditional string 
c. [ØQ ← αP] A semantically unacceptable conditional string 
d. [βQ ← αP] A grammatically unacceptable conditional string 
e. [βQ  ← ØP] A grammatically unacceptable conditional string 
f. [ØQ ← ØP] A grammatically unacceptable conditional string 
 
Hindi conditionals require the particle to (then) to follow the protasis irres-
pective of the type of conditional (i.e. relevance or ‘biscuit’14 conditionals 
(e.g. 21a and 21b), conditionals giving advice (e.g. 22a and 22b) or any 
other type of idiomatic conditional expressions (e.g. 23a and 23b). 
 
(21) a. (agar) āp  cāhẽ    to  biskuṭ  ālmārī=mẽ 
if   you want-SUBJ.3PL then biscuits sideboard=in  
rakhe  hɛ̃ 
placed aux-PRES.M.3PL 
‘If you want, there are biscuits on the sideboard.’ 
 
b.  biskuṭ  ālmārī=mẽ  rakhe  hɛ̃      agar  
biscuits sideboard=in placed aux-PRES.M.3PL if 
āp  cāhẽ    to 
you want-SUBJ.3PL then 
‘There are biscuits in the sideboard if you want them.’ 
 
(22) a. (agar) āp  merī bāt  mānẽ      to   koī 
if   you my advice accept-SUBJ.3PL then some 
davā    le lenā acchā  hogā 
medicine  take  better  be-FUT.3SG 
‘If I were you, I would take some medicine.’ 
 
b. koī  davā    le lenā acchā  hogā   agar 
some medicine  take  better  be-FUT.3SG if 
āp  merī bāt  mānẽ      to 
you my advice accept-SUBJ.3PL then 
‘If I were you, I would take some medicine.’ 
 
(23) a. (agar) āp  burā na  mānẽ      to   ek   bāt 
if  you bad not consider-SUBJ.3PL then one thing 
kahnā  chāhū̃gā 
say  want-FUT.3SG 
‘If you don’t mind, I would like to say something.’ 
  
 
b. ek   bāt  kahnā  chāhū̃gā   agar āp  burā 
one thing  tell  want-FUT.3SG if  you bad  
na  mānẽ       to   
not consider-SUBJ.3PL  then  
‘If you don’t mind, I would like to say something.’ 
 
Moreover, in Hindi only the presumed apodosis marker to (i.e. then) car-
ries all sorts of pragmatic meanings derived from scalarity (i.e. even if, only 
if, if and only if, etc.) in the protasis, as is clear from the examples in (24): 
 
(24) a. (agar) unhõne  mujhe  bulāyā    to 
if   they-ERG  me  invite-PFV.M.SG then 
mɛ̃  pārṭī=mẽ  jāū̃gā 
I  party=in  go-FUT.M.1SG 
‘If they invite/invited me, I will/would go to the party.’ 
 
b. (agar) unhõne  mujhe  bulāyā    to   hī 
if   they-ERG  me  invite-PFV.M.SG then only 
mɛ̃  pārṭī=mẽ  jāū̃gā 
I  party=in  go-FUT.M.1SG 
‘I will/would go to the party only if they invite/invited me.’ 
 
c. (agar) unhõne  mujhe  bulāyā    to   bhī 
if   they-ERG  me  invite-PFV.M.SG then even 
mɛ̃  pārṭī=mẽ nahī̃  jāū̃gā 
I  party=in  not go-FUT.M.1SG 
‘Even if they invite/invited me, I will/would not go to the party.’ 
 
All the examples in (24) unequivocally suggest a closer affinity of to (then) 
with the protasis rather than with the apodosis and provide proof that there 
is no apodosis-protasis ordering as such and that the conditionality of a 
sentence derives typically from the conditional string which includes the 
so-called apodosis marker as well. 
 
3.4. Class 4: Not obligatorily marked P + Not obligatorily marked Q 
On the basis of different studies, Mandarin can be classified among those 
languages which seem to have characteristics described in category (9d), 
since in it “the protasis necessarily precedes the apodosis, whether the 
  
protasis alone is marked for non-factuality (by a conjunction such as rúguǒ 
‘if’), whether the apodosis alone is marked (for instance by nà and/or jìu 
‘then, in that case’), whether both are marked, or whether neither is 
marked.” (Comrie 1986: 85), as in  
 
(25) (rúguǒ) Zhāngsān  hē   jǐu,  wǒ  (jìu)   mà  tā 
  (If)  Zhangsan drink wine I  (then)  scold him 
  ‘If Zangsan drinks wine, (then) I will scold him.’ 
 
where, as Comerie points out, the protasis must precede the apodosis, ir-
respective of whether either protasis or apodosis is marked overtly. Need-
less to say, the case of Mandarin lends even stronger support to our hypo-
thesis that there is only protasis-apodosis ordering in conditional 
statements regardless of the presence or absence of any overt clause mark-
ers. 
We can sum up our discussion of above four possible classes exhibiting 
different possible orderings of two clauses in a conditional statement in 
table 1. 
 
Table 1. Table sumarizing the four classes of conditional statement.15 
 P→Q      Q, P → 
1. Class 1  [αP→βQ]    — 
2. Class 2  [αP→Ø(β)Q]   [Q[αP→Ø]] 
3. Class 3  [(α)P→βQ]   [Q[αP→β]] 
4. Class 4  [(α)P→(β)Q]    — 
 
As is clear from table 1, languages belonging to classes 2 and 3 seem to 
exhibit the so-called apodosis-protasis (Q←P) ordering. In fact, data from 
these languages have led linguists to believe that a conditional statement 
may exhibit both clause orderings (i.e. P→Q and Q←P). However, as we 
have argued above, these cases in no way violate the universal of condi-
tional clause ordering (namely P→Q), since in such cases only the proposi-
tion contained in the apodosis is preposed. A null-marker at the end of the 
conditional string in class 2 effectively indicates that in these languages a 
preposing of the apodosis-proposition does regularly take place as a result 
of speaker’s different pragmatic strategies. Furthermore, data from the 
languages which belong to class 3 indubitably demonstrate that in these 
languages the so-called apodosis marker, say ‘β’, cannot be omitted and, 
except for a few cases,16 has to remain at the end of the conditional string 
even in cases where the apodosis-proposition has to be preposed or fronted. 
  
We believe that the preposing of apodosis-proposition attested in languages 
that belong to classes 2 and 3 of table 1 requires further pragmatic research 
in order to be better understood. One of the reasons of apodosis-
proposition preposing seems to derive from the fact that conditional state-
ments are always discourse-bound (see e.g. Akatsuta 1986). In fact, the 
phenomenon of apodosis-proposition preposing, reduced conditionals (i.e. 
delition of either P or Q), nonconditional conditionals (see Lycan 2001 for 
details) and pseudo-conditionals can only be understood in the light of 
discourse-bound nature of conditional statements. Thus, we believe that 
depending on the elements of knowledge shared by the speaker and hearer 
(available from the previous part of the discourse) the speaker may consid-
er it necessary to prepose the apodosis in order to highlight the information 
contained in it thus violating the normal clause-ordering. Another reason 
for apodosis-proposition preposing has to do with type of modality con-
tained in it. In fact, when the speaker has to express deontic modality in 
making requests or orders he invaribly begins the conditional statement by 
preposing the apodosis-proposition, as in, 
 
(25) a. Sit down, if you want! 
 b.? If you want sit down! 
 
We believe that similar observations can be made about other conditional 
statements where the apodosis carries non-assertive illocutionary forces –  
as is the case in uttering exclaimations, interrogatives etc. – and thus ex-
presses a non-epistemic modality. Subject to further language specific re-
search, we can expect apodoses carrying non-epistemic modal meanings to 
be always preposed – irrespective of syntactic differences in languages. In 
sum then, our analysis does not support the widely held belief according to 
which conditionals can have both orderings: P→Q and Q←P. 
4. Do protases contain speaker’s knowledge or beliefs? 
In order to determine an overall semantic contribution of the protasis to a 
conditional statement, it is necessary to establish the speaker’s attitude 
towards the nonfactuality in the protasis. In other words, it is important to 
see whether the protasis can contain speaker’s knowledge or beliefs. From 
the point of view of the speaker, conditional statements typically consist of 
three elements – the protasis, the apodosis and the relationship between the 
two – in which speaker’s epistemic stand can be assessed.17 Now, if we 
  
look at the four traditional types of English conditionals, we notice that 
there are four different situations. In the first case, there is conditional type 
0 such as If you heat water to 100 degrees celsius, it boils where the speak-
er knows the relation that holds between P and Q, but neither knows nor 
believes the stae of affairs in P and Q. In the case of second type of condi-
tionals, such as If it rains this afternoon, everybody will stay home, the 
speaker neither knows nor believes the state of affairs in the protasis but 
believes in the relation that holds between P and Q, and believes also that 
either necessarily or possibly Q (i.e. everybody will stay home). In the 
third type of conditionals, such as If she came back early, he wouldn’t be 
able to go to the party the speaker neither knows nor believes that P, but 
believes that possibly Q. The speaker believes that the relation between P 
and Q necessarily holds. The only category in which the speaker knows 
that ‘necessarily not-P’ is the fourth category. In fact, only the fourth type 
of conditionals, such as If she had bought a lottery ticket, she would have 
become rich contains the speaker’s counter-to-fact knowledge, namely that 
‘she did not buy a ticket’. We can thus summarize the epistemic state of the 
speaker in four types of conditionals in the following table. 
 
Table 2. Table showing the distribution of epistemic elements in the three parts of 
four types of epistemic conditional statements.18 
     P    →   Q 
1. Conditional type 0    ¬ KP/¬BP  K        ¬ KQ/¬BQ 
2. Conditional type 1    ¬ KP/¬BP  B   BQ 
3. Conditional type 2    ¬ KP/¬BP  B   BQ 
4. Conditional type 3  K¬P   K   K¬Q/ B¬Q 
 
Thus, as explained above in epistemic conditionals protases do not contain 
speaker’s knowledge or beliefs19 except in the fourth category of counte-
factuals where the speaker has a piece of counterfactual knowledge of the 
state of afairs in P and Q. In the first category, the speaker does not possess 
any piece of knowledge regarding specific occurances of P and Q, but ra-
ther of their generic occurances only. In other words, at all times, in all the 
cases of P it is necessarily Q. As Comrie (1986: 88) has rightly observed, it 
is difficult to accept a neat biparttite or tripartite division of conditional 
statements with a clear-cut boundary between the two or three types. In 
fact, different degrees of hypotheticality in conditional statements are very 
much subjective. However, if we look at the speaker’s epistemic state in 
table 2 we notice that there may be three types of conditionals only, as can 
  
be seen in table 3 where we have regrouped four types into three, namly A, 
B and C. The conditional types 2 (namely If she gives me ten dollar, I will 
do her job) and 3 (namely If she gave me ten dollar, I would do her job) 
attested in languages such as English express exactly the same epistemic 
stand of the speaker, as is clear from table 3. These three types can still be 
reduced to two types as the conditionals belonging to type 0 contain the 
lowest degree of hypotheticality and therefore are not real conditionals 
expressing hypotheticality. The conditionals in type 4 on the other hand 
contain the highest degree of hypotheticality. 
 
Table 3. A regrouping of four types of conditional statements presented in table 2. 
      P    →   Q 
A 1. Conditional type 0    ¬ KP/¬BP  K     ¬ KQ/¬BQ 
B 2. Conditional type 1    ¬ KP/¬BP  B   BQ 
 3. Conditional type 2    ¬ KP/¬BP  B   BQ 
C 4. Conditional type 3  K¬P   K   K¬Q/ B¬Q 
 
Let us now take another issue which has a direct bearing on the role 
played by the protasis in a conditional statement. Syntactically, conditional 
clauses have generally been thought to belong to, thus considered to have 
similar qualities of, a class of adverbials or complementizers. For example, 
Bhatt and Pancheva (2006) synthesize a widespread common belief among 
linguists according to which the conditional clause belongs to a class of 
adverbial clauses that includes, among others, clausal adverbial of time, 
cause, and concessions, as can be seen in examples in (26). 
 
(26) a. If Andrea arrived late, Clara must have got upset.  
b. When Andrea arrived late, Clara got upset. 
c. Because Andrea arrived late, Clara got upset. 
d. Although Andrea arrived on time, Clara got upset. 
 
It is argued that in (26a) the if-clause is attached to the then-clause in the 
same way as it is in the rest of examples (i.e. 26b, 26c, 26d). Thus, accord-
ing to this line of research, the conditional clause should get a treatment 
similar to the one in other cases. In pragmatic terms, though, this idea does 
not seem to stand up to close scrutiny. In our view, one of the striking cha-
racteristics of the protasis is that it, unlike other syntactic complementizers, 
does not carry and thus does not attach (or contribute) to conditional 
statements any epistemic elements derived from speaker’s knowledge or 
beliefs. To see the epistemic state of examples in (26) we can rephrase 
  
them in (27). We claim that, contrary to the widely held belief, protases do 
not carry speaker’s knowledge or belief, as can be seen in (27a) where the 
speaker neither knows nor believes that Andrea in fact came late at time t 
and thus the speaker’s necessary belief (B):  
 
(27)   a. ?The speaker knows that ‘Andrea arrived late at time t’, and the 
speaker believes that ‘Clara got upset at time t’. 
b. The speaker knows that (i) ‘Andrea arrived late at time t’, and (ii) 
‘Clara got upset at time t’. 
c. The speaker knows that (i) ‘Andrea arrived late at time t’, and (ii) 
‘Clara got upset at time t’ and believes that ‘(i) caused (ii)’. 
d. The speaker knows that (i) ‘Andrea arrived on time at time t’, and 
(ii) ‘Clara got upset at time t’. The speaker believes that ‘(ii) took 
place notwithstanding (i)’ 
 
In fact, (26a) cannot be paraphrased as (27a) since the speaker in making 
an utterance of (26a) does not know that Andrea in fact arrived late. Had 
the speaker known that, he would have instead made an utterance using 
other constructions such as: Given that/ Since/ As/ For Andrea arrived late 
... Consequently, we believe that it is a fundamental mistake to equate a 
conditional clause with an adverbial complementizer. There are no proofs 
to support the idea that (26a) is semantically similar to (26b), (26c) and 
(26d). 
Let us consider another similar argument which is related to the ques-
tion of the presence or absence of speaker’s epistemic elements, namely 
knowledge and beliefs in the protasis. In various syntactic analyses, it has 
been observed that conditional clauses (i.e. protases) are incompatible with 
Main Clause Phenomenon (exemplified in English by argument fronting). 
For example, it has been argued that English does not permit argument 
fronting, as (28b) is ungrammatical: 
 
(28) a. If you don’t pass these exams, you won’t get the degree. 
b.*If these exams you don’t pass, you won’t get the degree.  
 
Similarily, the protasis cannot contain the so-called Speaker Oriented Ad-
verbs. For example, an adverb such as frankly, renders (29b) ungrammatical.  
 
(29) a. If he’s unable to cope, we’ll have to replace him. 
b. ??*If frankly he’s unable to cope, we’ll have to replace him. 
 
  
We believe that these syntactic phenomena have to be considered from the 
point of view of the speaker’s epistemic stand only since it is difficult to 
provide an elegant syntactic analysis of conditionals without taking into 
consideration modal meanings of the speaker.  
5. The distribution of TAM elements in the Hindi protasis 
The TAM elements in the protasis are responsible for establishing different 
degrees of hypotheticality in a conditional statement as a whole, although 
they do not indicate the same meanings as they do when used in factual 
propositions. In order to show the distribution of Hindi TAM elements, we 
provide a list of possible combinations of the protasis and the apodosis in 
Hindi conditional statements in Appendix 3.  
 
Table 4. Distribution of possible TAM elements in the protasis and the apodosis of 
the Hindi conditional statements.20 
             P    Q 
1.  Simple perfective (aorist)       YES   YES 
2.  Past (aspect-less)          YES   YES 
3.  Past habitual           YES   YES  
4.  Past progressive          YES   YES 
5.  Past perfective          YES   YES 
6.  Present (aspect-less)         YES   YES 
7.  Present habitual          YES   YES 
8.  Present progressive         YES   YES 
9.  Present perfective         YES   YES 
10.  Future (aspect-less, presumptive)     YES   YES 
11.  Future habitual (presumptive)      YES   YES 
12.  Future progressive (presumptive)     YES   YES 
13.  Future perfective (presumptive)      YES   YES 
14.  Subjunctive (aspect-less)       YES   YES 
15.  Subjunctive habitual         YES   YES 
16.  Subjunctive progressive        YES   YES 
17.  Subjunctive perfective        YES   YES 
18.  Counterfactual (aspect-less)       YES   YES 
19.  Counterfactual habitual        YES   YES 
20.  Counterfactual progressive       YES   YES 
21.  Counterfactual perfective       YES   YES 
22.  Imperatives           NO    YES 
23.  Interrogatives           NO    YES 
  
24.  Exclamations           NO    YES 
 
As can be seen in more detail in Appendix 3, in Hindi the conditional type 
0 employs the present habitual in P and Q whereas the conditional type 3 
necessarily employs TAM elements listed in 18, 19, 20, 21 in table 4. The 
conditional type 2 requires P to be in the aorist tense and Q in the future 
tense. The conditional type 1 makes use of the rest of Hindi TAM elements. 
6. Conclusions 
Analyzing data mainly from Hindi, we have shown that a conditional 
statement obligatorily contains – either overtly or covertly – a conditional 
string, namely P―Q, which is indivisible and that the order of the two 
elements in the conditional string can never be reversed. This conclusion 
will have important implications for any type of syntactic analysis which 
aims to provide a division of a conditional statement according to the tradi-
tional line of thinking, namely [[P―], [Q―]]. Our proposal in this regard 
is that a syntactic analysis of conditional statements should have the fol-
lowing form: [[P―, Q] ―]] and, with a possible alternation, [― [P―, Q]], 
due to the preposing of the proposition contained in the apodosis. Thus we 
reject the syntactic analyses which look at the phenomenon along these 
lines: [[Q―], [P―]]. We have also demonstrated that the Hindi TAM ele-
ments in the protasis set up different degrees of hypotheticality of a condi-
tional statement. In addition, we have shown that contrary to widely held 
belief, the protasis carries neither speaker knowledge nor speaker belief. 
This pragmatic fact also explains why the protasis can contain neither the 
fronted argument nor speaker-oriented adverbs. 
Appendix 1 
To see the distribution of the Hindi TAM elements in the protasis (i.e. P), we pro-
vide in this appendix a list of examples which contain 21 out of 24 categories we 
registered in Table 3. Needless to say, imperatives, interrogatives and exclamations 
cannot appear in the protasis. 
 
P-TAM-1 Simple perfective/ aorist 
agar/us-ne/ un dinõ/ vakālat/ kī/ to … 
  
if/ he-ERG/ those days/ advocacy-F/ do-PFV.F.3SG/ then … 
‘If he practiced law those days, then …’ 
P-TAM-2 Past (aspect-less) 
agar/ vo/ un dinõ/ vakīl/ thā/ to … 
if/ he/ those days/ lawyer/ be-PST.M.3SG/ then … 
‘If he was a lawyer those days, then …’ 
P-TAM-3 Past habitual 
agar/ vo/ un dinõ/ vakālat/ kartā/ thā/ to … 
if/ he/ those days/ advocacy-F/ do-IMPFV.M.3SG/ AUX-PST.M.3SG/ then … 
‘If he practiced/ would practice law those days then …’ 
P-TAM-4 Past progressive/ 
agar/ vo/ us samay/ vakālat/ kar rahā/ thā/ to … 
if/ he/ that period/ advocacy-F/ do-PROG.M.3SG/ AUX-PST.M.3SG/ then … 
‘If he was practicing law during that period, then …’ 
P-TAM-5 Past perfective 
agar/ us-ne/ us samay/ vakālat/ kī/ thī/ to … 
if/ he-ERG/ at that time/ advocacy-F/ do-PFV.F.3SG/ AUX-PST.F.3SG/ then … 
‘If he then had practiced law, then …’ 
P-TAM-6 Present (aspect-less) 
agar/ vo/ vakīl/ hɛ/ to … 
if/ he/ lawyer/ be-PRES.3SG/ then … 
‘If he is a lawyer, then …’ 
P-TAM-7 Present habitual 
agar/ vo/ ab/ vakālat/ kartā/ hɛ/ to … 
if/ he/ now/ advocacy-F/ do-IMPFV.M.3SG/ AUX-PRES.3SG/ then … 
‘If he practices law now, then …’ 
P-TAM-8 Present progressive 
agar/ vo/ ab/ vakālat/ kar rahā/ hɛ/ to … 
if/ he/ now/ advocacy-F/ do-PROG.M.3SG/ AUX-PRES.3SG/ then … 
‘If he is practicing law now, then …’ 
P-TAM-9 Present perfective 
agar/ us-ne/ vakālat/ kī/ hɛ/ to … 
if/ he-ERG/ advocacy-F/ do-PFV.F.3SG/ AUX-PRES.3SG/ then … 
‘If has practiced law, then … ’ 
P-TAM-10  Future (aspect-less) 
agar/ vo/ vakālat/ karegā/ to … 
if/ he/ advocacy-F/ do-M.3SG/ then … 
‘If he will practice law, then …’ 
P-TAM-11  Future habitual (presumptive habitual) 
agar/ vo/ vakālat/ kartā/ hogā/ to … 
  
if/ he/ advocacy-F/ do-IMPFV.M.3SG/ AUX-PRESM/ then … 
‘If he must be practicing law, then …’ 
P-TAM-12  Future progressive (presumptive progressive) 
agar/ vo/ vakālat/ kar rahā/ hogā/ to … 
if/ he/ advocacy-F/ do-PROG.M.3SG/ AUX-FUT.M.3SG/ then … 
‘If he must be practicing law, then …’ 
P-TAM-13  Future perfective (presumptive perfective) 
agar/us-ne/ vakālat/ kī/ hogī/ to … 
if/ he-ERG/ advocacy-F/ do-PFV.F.3SG/ AUX-FUT.F.3SG/ then … 
‘If he must have practiced law, then …’ 
P-TAM-14  Subjunctive (aspect-less) 
agar/ vo/ vakālat/ kare/ to … 
if/ he/ advocacy/ do-SUBJ.3SG/ then … 
‘If he should practice law, then …’ 
P-TAM-15  Subjunctive habitual 
agar/ vo/ vakālat/ kartā/ ho/ to … 
if/ he/ advocacy-F/ do-IMPFV.M.3SG/ AUX-SUBJ/ then … 
‘If he may be practicing law, then …’ 
P-TAM-16  Subjunctive progressive 
agar/ vo/ vakālat/ kar rahā/ ho/ to … 
if/ he/ advocacy-F/ do-PROG.M.3SG/ AUX-SUBJ.3SG/ then … 
‘If he may be practicing law, then …’ 
P-TAM-17  Subjunctive perfective 
agar/ us-ne/ vakālat/ kī/ ho/ to … 
if/ he-ERG/ advocacy-F/ do-PFV.F.3SG/ AUX-SUBJ.3SG/ then … 
‘If he may have practiced law, then …’ 
P-TAM-18  Counterfactual (aspect-less) 
agar/ vo/ vakālat/ kartā/ to … 
if/ he/ advocacy-F/ do-IMPFV.M.3SG/ then … 
‘If he had practiced law then …’ 
P-TAM-19  Counterfactual habitual 
agar/ vo/ un dinõ/ vakālat/ kartā/ hotā/ to … 
if/ he/ those days/ advocacy-F/ do-IMPFV.M.3SG/ AUX-IMPFV.M.3SG/ then … 
‘If he had been practicing law those days, then …’ 
P-TAM-20  Counterfactual progressive 
agar/ vo/ un dinõ/ vakālat/ kar rahā/ hotā/ to … 
if/ he/ those days/ advocacy-F/ do-PROG.M.3SG/ AUX-IMPFV.M.3SG/ then … 
‘If he had been practicing law those days, then …’ 
P-TAM-21  Counterfactual perfective 
agar/ us-ne/ vakālat/ kī/ hotī/ to … 
  
if/ he-ERG/ advocacy-F/ do-PFV.F.3SG/ AUX-IMPFV.F.3SG/ then … 
‘If he had practiced law, then …’ 
Appendix 2 
In this appendix, we provide examples of the apodosis (i.e. Q) containing all the 24 
types of TAM elements listed in Table 3. 
Q-TAM-1 Simple perfective (aorist) 
(to)/ usne/ zarūr/ ferrārī/ kharīdī 
(then)/ he-ERG/ certainly/ Ferrari/ buy-PFV.F.3SG 
‘(then) he certainly bought a Ferrari.’ 
Q-TAM-2 Past (aspect-less) 
(to)/ vo/ bahut pɛse vālā/ thā 
(then)/ he/ very rich/ be-PST.M.3SG 
‘(then) he was very rich.’ 
Q-TAM-3 Past habitual 
(to)/ vo/ roz/ wiskī/ pītā/ thā 
(then)/ he/ everyday/ whisky/ drink-IMPFV.M.SG/ AUX-PST.M.3SG 
‘(then) he drank whisky everyday.’ 
Q-TAM-4 Past progressive 
(to)/ vo/ us samay/ wiskī/ pī rahā/ thā 
(then)/ he/ at that moment/ whisky/ drink-PROG.M/ AUX-PST.M.3SG 
‘(then) he was drinking whisky at that moment.’ 
Q-TAM-5 Past perfective 
(to)/ usne/ zarūr/ ferrārī/ kharīd lī/ thī 
(then)/ he-ERG/ certainly/ Ferrari/ buy-take-PFV.F.SG/ AUX-PRES.3SG 
‘(then) he certainly had bought a Ferrari.’ 
Q-TAM-6 Present (aspect-less) 
(to)/ vo/ bahut pɛse vālā/ hɛ 
(then)/ he/ very rich/ be-PRES.3SG 
‘(then) he is very rich.’ 
Q-TAM-7 Present habitual 
(to)/ vo/ roz/ wiskī/ pītā/ hɛ 
(then)/ he/ everyday/ whisky/ drink-IMPFV.M.SG/ AUX-PRES.3SG 
‘(then) he drinks whisky everday.’ 
Q-TAM-8 Present progressive 
(to)/ vo/ is samay/ wiskī/ pī rahā/ hɛ 
(then)/ he/ this moment/ whisky/ drink-PROG.M.SG/ AUX-PRES.3SG 
‘(then) he is drinking whisky at the moment.’ 
  
Q-TAM-9 Present perfective 
(to)/ usne/ zarūr/ ferrārī/ kharīd lī/ hɛ 
(then)/ he-ERG/ certainly/ Ferrari/ buy-take-PFV.F.SG/ AUX-PRES.3SG 
‘(then) he certainly has bought a Ferrari.’ 
Q-TAM-10 Future (aspect-less, presumptive) 
(to)/ vo/ zarūr/ bahut pɛse vālā/ hogā 
(then)/ he/ certainly/ very rich/ be-FUT.3SG 
‘(then) he must certainly be very rich.’ 
Q-TAM-11 Future habitual (presumptive) 
(to)/ vo/ zarūr/ roz/ wiskī/ pītā/ hogā 
(then)/ he/ certainly/ everyday/ whisky/ drink-IMPFV.M.SG/ AUX-PRES.3SG 
‘(then) he must be drinking whisky everyday.’ 
Q-TAM-12 Future progressive (presumptive) 
(to)/ vo/ zarūr/ is samay/ wiskī/ pī rahā/ hogā 
(then)/ he/ certainly/ this moment/ whisky/ drink-PROG.M.SG/ AUX-PRES.3SG 
‘(then) he must be drinking whisky at the moment.’ 
Q-TAM-13 Future prefective (Presumptive) 
(to)/ usne/ zarūr/ ferrārī/ kharīd lī/ hogī 
(then)/ he-ERG/ certainly/ Ferrari/ buy-take-PFV.F.SG/ AUX-FUT.F.3SG 
‘(then) he certainly must have bought a Ferrari.’ 
Q-TAM-14 Subjunctive (aspect-less) 
(to)/ ho saktā hɛ ki/ vo/ bahut pɛse vālā/ ho 
(then)/ it may be that/ he/ very rich/ be-SUBJ.3SG 
‘(then) maybe he is very rich.’ 
Q-TAM-15 Subjunctive habitual 
(to)/ ho saktā hɛ ki/ vo/ roz/ wiskī/ pītā/ ho 
(then)/ may be that/ he/ everyday/ whisky/ drink-IMPFV.M.SG/ AUX-SUBJ.3SG 
‘(then) it may be that he drinks whisky everyday.’ 
Q-TAM-16 Subjunctive progressive 
(to)/ ho saktā hɛ ki/ vo/ ab/ wiskī/ pī rahā/ ho 
(then)/ may be that/ he/ now/ whisky/ drink-PROG.M.SG/ AUX-SUBJ.3SG 
‘(then) he may be drinking whisky now.’ 
Q-TAM-17 Subjunctive perfective 
(to)/ ho saktā hɛ ki/ usne/ ferrārī/ kharīd lī/ ho 
(then)/ may be that/ he-ERG/ Ferrari/ buy-take-PFV.F.SG/ AUX-SUBJ.3SG 
‘(then) he may have bought a Ferrari.’ 
Q-TAM-18 Counterfactual (aspect-less) 
(to)/ vo/ bahut pɛse vālā/ hotā 
(then)/ he/ very rich/ be-IMPFV.M.3SG 
‘(then) he would have been very rich.’ 
  
Q-TAM-19 Counterfactual habitual 
(to)/ vo/ roz/ wiskī/ pītā/ hotā 
(then)/ he/ everyday/ whisky/ drink-IMPFV.M.SG/ AUX-IMPFV.M.3SG 
‘(then) he would have been drinking whisky everyday.’ 
Q-TAM-20 Counterfactual progressive 
(to)/ vo/ is samay/ wiskī/ pī rahā/ hotā 
(then)/ he/ this moment/ whisky/ drink-PROG.M.SG/ AUX-IMPFV.M.3SG 
‘(then) he would have been drinking whisky now.’ 
Q-TAM-21 Counterfactual perfective 
(to)/ usne/ zarūr/ ferrārī/ kharīd lī/ hotī 
(then)/ he-ERG/ certainly/ Ferrari/ buy-take-PFV.F.SG/ AUX-IMPFV.F.3SG 
‘(then) he certainly would have bought a Ferrari.’ 
Q-TAM-22 Imperative 
(to)/ use/ zarūr/ bulāo 
(then)/ him/ certainly/ invite-IMP.2PL 
‘(then) invite him!’ 
Q-TAM-23 Interrogative 
(to)/ uskā/ beṭā/ kyā/ kartā/ hɛ 
(then)/ his/ son/ what/ do-IMPFV.M.3SG/ AUX-PRES.3SG 
‘(then) what does his son do?’ 
Q-TAM-24 Exclamations 
(to)/ mujhe/ kyā/ lenā-denā! 
(then)/ to me/ what/ take-give 
‘(then) who cares!’ 
Appendix 3 
In this appendix we provide a list of possible combinations of different types of 
protasis (P) and apodosis (Q) in conditional statements in Hindi. All the numbers 
refer to those in Table 3. Although the list is derived bearing in mind a possible 
combination of types in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2, not all the following combi-
nations can be obtained by simply combining the examples we have supplied since 
their semantic content is not always coherent. 
 
P-TAM-1 + [Q-TAM-2]/ [Q-TAM-6]/ [Q-TAM-10]/ [Q-TAM-11]/ [Q-TAM-12]/ [Q-
TAM-13]/ [Q-TAM-14]/ [Q-TAM-15]/ [Q-TAM-16]/ [Q-TAM-17]/ [Q-
TAM-22]/ [Q-TAM-23]/ [Q-TAM-24] 
  
P-TAM-2 +  [Q-TAM-2]/ [Q-TAM-3]/ [Q-TAM-10]/ [Q-TAM-11]/ [Q-TAM-12]/ [Q-
TAM-13]/ [Q-TAM-14]/ [Q-TAM-15]/ [Q-TAM-16]/ [Q-TAM-17]/ [Q-
TAM-22]/ [Q-TAM-23]/ [Q-TAM-24] 
P-TAM-3 + [Q-TAM-2]/ [Q-TAM-10]/ [Q-TAM-11]/ [Q-TAM-12]/ [Q-TAM-13]/ [Q-
TAM-14]/ [Q-TAM-15]/ [Q-TAM-16]/ [Q-TAM-17]/ [Q-TAM-22]/ [Q-
TAM-23]/ [Q-TAM-24] 
P-TAM-4 + [Q-TAM-2]/ [Q-TAM-10]/ [Q-TAM-11]/ [Q-TAM-12]/ [Q-TAM-13]/ [Q-
TAM-14]/ [Q-TAM-15]/ [Q-TAM-16]/ [Q-TAM-17]/ [Q-TAM-22]/ [Q-
TAM-23]/ [Q-TAM-24] 
P-TAM-5 + [Q-TAM-2]/[Q-TAM-6]/ [Q-TAM-10]/ [Q-TAM-11]/ [Q-TAM-12]/ [Q-
TAM-13]/ [Q-TAM-14]/ [Q-TAM-15]/ [Q-TAM-16]/ [Q-TAM-17]/ [Q-
TAM-22]/ [Q-TAM-23]/ [Q-TAM-24] 
P-TAM-6 + [Q-TAM-6]/ [Q-TAM-7]/ [Q-TAM-8]/ [Q-TAM-9]/ [Q-TAM-10]/ [Q-TAM-
11]/ [Q-TAM-12]/ [Q-TAM-13]/ [Q-TAM-14]/ [Q-TAM-15]/ [Q-TAM-16]/ 
[Q-TAM-17]/ [Q-TAM-22]/ [Q-TAM-23]/ [Q-TAM-24] 
P-TAM-7 + [Q-TAM-6]/ [Q-TAM-7]/ [Q-TAM-8]/ [Q-TAM-9]/ [Q-TAM-10]/ [Q-TAM-
11]/ [Q-TAM-12]/ [Q-TAM-13]/ [Q-TAM-14]/ [Q-TAM-15]/ [Q-TAM-16]/ 
[Q-TAM-17]/ [Q-TAM-22]/ [Q-TAM-23]/ [Q-TAM-24] 
P-TAM-8 + [Q-TAM-6]/ [Q-TAM-7]/ [Q-TAM-8]/ [Q-TAM-9]/ [Q-TAM-10]/ [Q-TAM-
11]/ [Q-TAM-12]/ [Q-TAM-13]/ [Q-TAM-14]/ [Q-TAM-15]/ [Q-TAM-16]/ 
[Q-TAM-17]/ [Q-TAM-22]/ [Q-TAM-23]/ [Q-TAM-24] 
P-TAM-9 + [Q-TAM-6]/ [Q-TAM-7]/ [Q-TAM-8]/ [Q-TAM-9]/ [Q-TAM-10]/ [Q-TAM-
11]/ [Q-TAM-12]/ [Q-TAM-13]/ [Q-TAM-14]/ [Q-TAM-15]/ [Q-TAM-16]/ 
[Q-TAM-17]/ [Q-TAM-22]/ [Q-TAM-23]/ [Q-TAM-24] 
P-TAM-10 + [Q-TAM-10]/[Q-TAM-12]/ [Q-TAM-13]/ [Q-TAM-22]/ [Q-TAM-23]/ [Q-
TAM-24] 
P-TAM-11 + [Q-TAM-22]/ [Q-TAM-23]/ [Q-TAM-24] 
P-TAM-12 + [Q-TAM-10]/ [Q-TAM-11]/ [Q-TAM-12]/ [Q-TAM-13]/ [Q-TAM-22]/ [Q-
TAM-23]/ [Q-TAM-24] 
P-TAM-13 + [Q-TAM-10]/ [Q-TAM-11]/ [Q-TAM-12]/ [Q-TAM-13]/ [Q-TAM-14]/ [Q-
TAM-22]/ [Q-TAM-23]/ [Q-TAM-24] 
P-TAM-14 + [Q-TAM-14]/ [Q-TAM-22]/ [Q-TAM-23]/ [Q-TAM-24] 
P-TAM-15 + [Q-TAM-10]/[Q-TAM-14]/ [Q-TAM-15]/ [Q-TAM-16]/ [Q-TAM-17]/ [Q-
TAM-22]/ [Q-TAM-23]/ [Q-TAM-24] 
P-TAM-16 + [Q-TAM-14]/ [Q-TAM-15]/ [Q-TAM-16]/ [Q-TAM-17]/ [Q-TAM-22]/ [Q-
TAM-23]/ [Q-TAM-24] 
P-TAM-17 + [Q-TAM-6]/[Q-TAM-10]/[Q-TAM-14]/ [Q-TAM-15]/ [Q-TAM-16]/ [Q-
TAM-17]/ [Q-TAM-22]/ [Q-TAM-23]/ [Q-TAM-24] 
P-TAM-18 + [Q-TAM-18]/ [Q-TAM-19]/ [Q-TAM-20]/ [Q-TAM-21]/ [Q-TAM-22]/ [Q-
TAM-23]/ [Q-TAM-24] 
P-TAM-19 + [Q-TAM-18]/ [Q-TAM-19]/ [Q-TAM-20]/ [Q-TAM-21]/ [Q-TAM-22]/ [Q-
TAM-23]/ [Q-TAM-24] 
  
P-TAM-20 + [Q-TAM-18]/ [Q-TAM-19]/ [Q-TAM-20]/ [Q-TAM-21]/ [Q-TAM-22]/ [Q-
TAM-23]/ [Q-TAM-24] 
P-TAM-21 + [Q-TAM-18]/ [Q-TAM-19]/ [Q-TAM-20]/ [Q-TAM-21]/ [Q-TAM-22]/ [Q-
TAM-23]/ [Q-TAM-24] 
Abbreviations 
1 = first person; 2 = second person; 3 = third person; ABL = ablative; ACC = accusa-
tive; AUX = auxiliary; CFV = contrafactive (counterfactual); CONT = continuous; 
ERG = ergative; F = feminine; FUT = future; HON = honorific; IMP = imperative; 
IMPFV = imperfective; M = masculine; OBL = oblique; PART = particle; PASS = pas-
sive; PFV = perfective; PL = plural; PRES = present; PRESM = presumptive; PROG = 
progressive; PST = past; SG = singular; SUBJ = subjunctive. 
Notes 
* I am grateful to Professor Peter Edwin Hook (Michigan) for helpful sugges-
tions. Needless to say, I am solely responsible for all errors and inaccuracies 
which may occur. 
1. Although familiar with the technicalities of different brands of theories of 
conditionals, both formal and informal, semantic as well as syntactic, we in-
tend to avoid any direct discussion of them altogether since our aim in this 
brief study is to put forward certain new ideas and our conviction is that once 
one starts discussing the technicalities of any theory, one remains entrapped in 
it, in a no-go situation. This is especially when, in order to follow these theo-
ries, you have to begin by using the terms which have been inappropriately 
used for centuries. Most of the logical theories of conditionals, to cite just one 
case, have misused the terms ‘indicative’ and ‘subjunctive’ in their discussion, 
without ascertaining the basic meaning of the terms. Thus, we will be using the 
following terms and symbols: protasis = the first clause or P-clause or the an-
tecedent, apodosis = the second clause or Q-clause or consequent, □ = modal 
necessity operator, ◊ = modal possibility operator, ¬ = negative modality op-
erator. 
2. After giving a concise account of different syntactic theories of conditional, 
Bhat and Pancheva (2006) advance an idea by which there is a need to provide 
two different solutions for two types of attachments, one for the sentence-
initial protasis and another for the sentence-final protasis. We believe that syn-
  
tacticians will rather have to find some other solutions for a dislocation of the 
proposition contained in the apodosis. 
3. A good discussion of such quasi-conditionals in English can be found in 
“Non-conditional Conditionals”, Michael L. Geis and William G. Lycan in 
Real Conditionals W. G. Lycan, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 184-205. 
4. For an excellent survey of such pseudo-P or pseudo-Q conditional construc-
tions, see Renaat Declerck and Susan Reed (2001). 
5. Without paying due attention to the crucial role played by the protasis (condi-
tional clause) in the actualization of a conditional statement, most studies have 
by and large accepted the terms ‘subordinate clause’ or ‘dependent clause’ to 
designate the protasis. We argue that this is misleading since the protasis is the 
founding clause of a conditional statement and thus cannot be termed ‘depen-
dent’. Citing the Cambridge International Dictionary of English, Declerck 
and Reed (2001) argue that a ‘subordinate’ clause is the one which cannot 
form a separate sentence but which can form a sentence when joined with a 
main clause. In the present study we do not follow this line of thought. 
6. See Johnson-Laird 1986. 
7. Elisabeth Traugott, Alice Ter Meulen, Juddy Snitzer Reilly, and Charles A. 
Ferguson, 1986, p. 9. 
8. As mentioned in Sharma (2010), our claim is based exclusively on the data 
discussed in the following typological studies: (1) Typology of Conditional 
Constrctions, Victor S. Xrakovskij (ed.), (2005) for Bulgarian (Rousselina Ni-
colova), Armenian (Natalia A. Kozintseva), Dari (Boris Ya. Ostrovsky), Hindi 
(Tatayana I. Oranskaya), Homeric Greek (Ilja A. Perelmouter), Early Latin 
(Margarita K. Sabaneyeva), French (Elena E. Kordi), German (Svetlana M. 
Kibardina), English (Tatiana G. Akimova, Natalia A. Kozintseva), Finnish 
(Hannu Tommola), Estonian (Irina P. Külmoja), Hungarian (László Jaszai, 
Ethelka Tóth), Hausa (Myrrah A. Smirnova, Nikolaj A. Dobronravin), Kla-
math (Viktor A. Stegniy), Indonesian (Alexander K. Ogloblin), Cambodian 
(Natalia M. Spatari), Vietnamese (Igor S. Bystrov, Nonna V. Stankevič), Chi-
nese (Tamara N. Nikitina), Even (Andrej L. Malchukov), Evenki (Igor V. 
Nedjalkov, Nina Ya. Bulatova), Eskimo (Nikolaj B. Vaxtin), Aleut (Evgeniy 
V. Golovko), Yukaghir languages (Elena S. Maslova) and Japanese (Vladimir 
M. Alpatov, Vera I. Podlesskaya); (2) The semantics of Clause Linking, R. M. 
W. Dixon, and Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald (eds.), (2009) for Akkadian, Galo, 
Khan, Manambu, Iquito, Aguaruna, Ojibwe, Fijian, Toqabaqita, Martuthunira, 
Korean, Goemai, Konso and Mali; (3) The Indo-Aryan Languages, Colin P. 
Masica, (1991) for various Indo-Aryan languages. None of the languages dis-
cussed in above mentioned works seems to have ‘apodosis-protasis’ ordering 
with overt markers. 
9. Donaldson (1980: 251-2), cited in Comrie (1986: 84). 
10. In logic, conditionals (i.e. material implications: P→Q) are defined as a rela-
tion between P and Q which is said to be true in the following three cases: (1) 
  
P and Q are true (2) P is false and Q is true (3) both P and Q are false. The re-
lation is false only when P is true and Q is false. In bi-conditionality (P↔Q), 
the relation is false in the second case: P is false and Q is true. Geis and 
Zwicky (1971) were perhaps the first to notice this and to claim that the actual 
interpretation of many conditional sentences is a bi-conditional (‘if and only 
if’) interpretation. Thus, If it rains, they will cancel the game (P, Q) is taken to 
mean No rain, no cancellation (¬P, ¬Q). Likewise, Iatridou (1991, 1994) ar-
gues that the use of then in a conditional statement suggests that an iff-reading 
is not false. 
11. Bhatt and Pancheva (2006) cite these examples from R. Izvorski, The Present 
Perfect as an Epistemic Modal. In A. Lawson (ed.) Proceedings of SALT VII, 
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, Cornell Linguistic Club, 1997. 
12. According to Iatridou (1991, 1994) then in conditional statements is not va-
cuous and is associated with a particular presupposition. A conditional of the 
form ‘If P, then Q’ presupposes that some of the ¬P are ¬Q. 
13. We assume that further supportive evidence may come form other Indo-Aryan 
languages, although we have made no attempt in this direction. 
14. Named so after Austin’s famous example, “If you are hungry, there are bis-
cuits on the sideboard.” (Austin 1961) 
15. In this table, P and Q stand for the propositions contained in the protasis and 
the apodosis respectively. α and β are overt markers of the protasis and the 
apodosis respectively. The element within brackets () is not-obligatory. Ø is a 
null marker. 
16. As mentioned above, Hindi conditionals require the so-called apodosis marker 
to ‘then’ to be used always, no matter what the cluase ordering is (i.e. 
[agarP→ toQ] or [Q-[agar-P→ to]]). Nevetheless, it is possible to encounter 
examples such as the following one where the use of to in [Q-[agar-P→ to]] is 
not obligatory: 
mɛ̃/zarūr hī/ pārṭī mẽ/ gayā hotā/ agar/ usne/ mujhe/ bulāyā hotā 
I/ certainly EMP/ party=in/ go-PFV-M-SG aux-IMFV-M-SG/if/ he-ERG/ invite-PFV-
M-SG aux-IMFV-SG 
‘I certainly would have gone to the party if he/she had invited me.’ 
17. In this discussion we are concerned exclusively with the protases which con-
tain some epistemic elements. Thus, we do not attempt to analyze conditional 
statements such as “If you open the window, I will kiss/kill you” where the 
protasis carries the speaker’s indirect illocutions, invitation/prohibition to car-
ry out the task rather than speaker’s epistemic stand. 
18. As in the table 1, P and Q stand for propositions of the protasis and the apodo-
sis respectively. K and B stand for ‘knowledge’ and ‘belief’ and ¬ is a nega-
tive marker. The arrow indicates the relationship between P and Q. 
19. We do not consider example such as If you love Clara so much, why don’t you 
marry her a counter-example even if in such cases the speaker may know the 
  
facts reported in the protasis since it is the speaker’s epistemic comunicative 
stand that counts not what he may know or believe. 
20. Examples for P-clause and Q-clause are provided in the Appendices 1 and 2, 
respectively. 
 
References 
Akatsuka, Noriko 
 1986 Conditionals are discourse-bound. In On Conditionals, Elizabeth 
Closs Traugott, Alice ter Meulen, Judy Snitzer Reilly, and Charles A. 
Ferguson (eds.), 333–351. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Austin, John L. 
 1961 Ifs and cans. In Austin, J. L., Philosophical Papers (3rd edition, 
1979, edited by J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock). Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 153–180. 
Bhatt, Rajesh, and Roumyana Pancheva 
 2006 Conditionals. In The Blackwell Companion to Syntax, Vol. 1, Martin 
Everaert, and Henk van Riemsdijk (eds.), 638–687. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Comrie, Bernard 
 1986 Conditionals: A typology. In On Conditionals, Elizabeth Closs Trau-
gott, Alice ter Meulen, Judy Snitzer Reilly, and Charles A. Ferguson 
(eds.), 77–99. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Dancygier, Barbara, and Eve Sweetser 
 1997 Then in conditional constructions. Cognitive Linguistics 8–2: 109–
136. 
Declerck, Renaat, and Susan Reed  
 2001 Conditionals, A Comprehensive Empirical Analysis. Berlin: Mouton 
de Gruyter. 
Fauconnier, Gilles 
 1994 Mental Spaces. Aspects of meaning construction in natural lan-
guage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [1st Edition, 1985, 
Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
Geis, Michael, and Arnold M. Zwicky 
 1971 On invited inferences. Linguistic Inquiry 2: 561–566. 
Greenberg, Joseph H.  
 1963 Some universals of grammar with particular reference to the order of 
meaningful elements. In Universals of language, Joseph H. Green-
berg (ed.). Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Haiman, John 
 1978 Conditionals are topics. Language 54: 565–589. 
  
 1986 Constraints on the form and meaning of the protasis. In On Condi-
tionals, Elizabeth Closs Traugott, Alice ter Meulen, Judy Snitzer 
Reilly, and Charles A. Ferguson (eds.), 215–227. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press. 
Iatridou, Sabine 
 1994 On the contribution of conditional then. Natural Language Seman-
tics 2: 171–199. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N.  
 1986 Conditionals and mental models. In On Conditionals, Elizabeth 
Closs Traugott, Alice ter Meulen, Judy Snitzer Reilly, and Charles A. 
Ferguson (eds.), 55–75. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
König, Ekkehard 
 1988 Concessive connectives and concessive sentences: cross-linguistic 
regularities and pragmatic principles. In Explaining Language Uni-
versals, John A. Hawkins (ed.), 145–166. Oxford: Basil Backwell. 
Levinson, Stephen C. 
 2000 Presumptive Meanings – The Theory of Generalized Conversational 
Implicature, Cambridge, MA : MIT Press. 
Lycan, William G. 
 2001 Real Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Masica, Colin P. 
 1991 The Indo-Aryan Languages. (Cambridge Language Surveys) Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press. 
McGregor, Ronald Stuart 
 1995 Outline of Hindi Grammar. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Monatut, Annie 
 2004 A Grammar of Hindi. (LINCOM Studies in Indo-European Linguis-
tics) Munich: Lincom Europa. 
Oranskaya, Tatyana I. 
 2005 Conditional constructions in Hindi. In Typology of Conditional Con-
structions, Victor S. Xrakovskij (ed.), 218–245. (LINCOM Studies 
in Theoretical Linguistics 25.) Munich: Lincom Europa. 
Sharma, Ghanshyam 
 2008 A pragmatic account of the Hindi presumptive. In Annual Review of 
South Asian Languages and Linguistics, Rajendra Singh (ed.), 83–
113. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 
 2010 On Hindi conditionals. In Annual Review of South Asian Languages 
and Linguistics, Rajendra Singh (ed.), 107–134. Berlin: Mouton de 
Gruyter. 
Traugott, Elizabeth Closs, Alice ter Meulen, Judy Snitzer Reilly and Charles A. 
Ferguson (eds.) 
 1986 On Conditionals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Van der Auwera, Johan 
  
 1986 Conditionals and speech acts. In On Conditionals, Elizabeth Closs 
Traugott, Alice ter Meulen, Judy Snitzer Reilly, and Charles A. Fer-
guson (eds.), 197–214. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Xrakovskij, Victor S. (ed.) 
 2005 Typology of Conditional Constructions. (LINCOM Studies in Theo-
retical Linguistics 25.). Muenchen: Lincom Europa. 
 
